{"id":105486,"date":"2026-05-09T13:13:32","date_gmt":"2026-05-09T11:13:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/?p=105486"},"modified":"2026-05-09T13:13:34","modified_gmt":"2026-05-09T11:13:34","slug":"patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/","title":{"rendered":"Patents Are Good \u2014 Busting the Myths of Patent Critics"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Here is a fact that rarely gets stated plainly: the cancer drugs that saved lives in your family, the precision tools that German manufacturers sell across the world, and the mRNA technology that ended the COVID pandemic were all built on patent protection. Every credible attempt to abolish patents or gut patent enforcement has been backed by the companies that no longer need them \u2014 the tech giants who already dominate through data monopolies, network effects, and trade secrets that no startup can replicate. When Elon Musk tweets “delete all IP law,” he is not advocating for the small inventor. He is pulling up the ladder. And the economists who claim patents harm innovation have not found a single real economy where abolishing them produced better results. What follows is a full examination of every serious argument the critics make \u2014 and why, when examined against the evidence, not one of them holds up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Rolf
Rolf Claessen<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Every few years, voices emerge calling the patent system broken, harmful, or obsolete. Tech billionaires tweet that we should “delete all IP.” Economists publish papers arguing patents stifle innovation. Podcasters dedicate episodes to “the case against patents.” These arguments deserve serious answers \u2014 not dismissals. This article works through the 22 most frequently cited objections to patents, presents each critic’s strongest case, and then provides the three most compelling counter-arguments grounded in empirical studies, institutional data, and expert testimony. The goal is not to declare the patent system perfect. It is to show that the critics’ case, examined closely, does not hold up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I am advising clients for over 20 years on patent matters already and I heard these arguments over and over. I take the chance to address all of them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

22\u00a0Myths\u00a0of\u00a0Patent\u00a0Critics<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

1. Patents Do Not Stimulate Innovation<\/a>
2. Patents Create Monopolies That Harm Consumers via High Drug Prices<\/a>
3. Patent Trolls \/ NPEs Abuse the System<\/a>
4. Patent Thickets Block Follow-On Innovation<\/a>
5. The Patent System Is Captured by Incumbent Interests<\/a>
6. Patents Harm Global Health and Developing Nations<\/a>
7. Low-Quality \/ Trivially Obvious Patents Are Routinely Granted<\/a>
8. Software and Business Method Patents Are Harmful<\/a>
9. Prize Systems and Government Grants Would Work Better<\/a>
10. Ideas Cannot Be “Owned” \u2014 Patents Are Philosophically Incoherent<\/a>
11. Patents Favor Large Corporations Over Small Inventors<\/a>
12. Pharma Evergreening Extends Monopolies Beyond Their Legitimate Term<\/a>
13. Patents Historically Concentrated Corporate Power<\/a>
14. Innovation Happens Perfectly Well Without Patents<\/a>
15. Patent Litigation Is Pure Dead-Weight Economic Loss<\/a>
16. Gene Patents and “Patents on Life” Are Ethically Objectionable<\/a>
17. Affordable Patent Lawyers Are Not Good Enough \u2014 The “Wrong Attorney” Problem<\/a>
18. Disclosure Without Enforcement Is the Worst Possible Outcome<\/a>
19. Patents Are Unenforceable Against Chinese Manufacturers<\/a>
20. Defending Patents Destroys Inventors Financially \u2014 The Goodyear Precedent<\/a>
21. EUIPO Expansion Into Patents Is Institutional Overreach<\/a>
22. Patents Are Aggression Against Tangible Property Owners \u2014 The Kinsella Argument<\/a>
23. Verdict: What the Evidence Actually Shows<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n
Need help with patents? Contact me!<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 1 \u2014 Most Frequently Cited: Patents Do Not Stimulate Innovation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Economists Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, in their widely cited 2013 paper in the Journal of Economic Perspectives<\/em>, state flatly: there is no empirical evidence that patents serve to increase innovation and productivity. They point to the “patent puzzle” \u2014 despite a massive increase in patent filings since the 1980s and dramatically stronger legal protection, there has been no corresponding acceleration in R&D investment or productivity growth. Historical cases are invoked: Italy outperformed the UK in pharmaceutical innovation before introducing patent protection in 1978; Germany produced more drug innovations than Britain when it could only patent processes, not compounds. Conclusion: patents reward rent-seeking, not invention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: Boldrin & Levine, JEP (2013)<\/a> \u00b7 Washington Post (2012)<\/a> \u00b7 HBS Nicholas (2013)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. The macro data contradicts the claim.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The EUIPO\/EPO joint study (2026)<\/a>, covering 361 industries across 2021\u20132023, found that patent-intensive industries alone account for 18.4% of EU GDP and 11.8% of EU employment \u2014 \u20ac7.7 trillion of economic activity. WIPO’s World Intellectual Property Report (2015)<\/a> examined six breakthrough technologies \u2014 aviation, antibiotics, semiconductors, 3D printing, nanotechnology, and robotics \u2014 and found evidence the IP system supported innovation across all of them, with no indication that high patent volumes caused increased friction. The Boldrin\/Levine thesis rests on aggregate patent-count correlations. But patent counts exploded largely because of strategic defensive filing by corporations. The correct test \u2014 whether patent-holding innovators invest more in R&D than comparable firms that do not hold patents \u2014 consistently yields a positive answer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: EUIPO\/EPO joint study (2026)<\/a> \u00b7 WIPO World IP Report (2015)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Pharma is the decisive test case \u2014 and patents pass it decisively.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The Congressional Budget Office (2021)<\/a> confirms that patent-based exclusivity is the primary mechanism making new drug development commercially viable. The landmark Mansfield (1986) survey of 100 US manufacturing firms in 12 industries, documented in detail by Health Affairs (2015)<\/a>, found 65% of commercially introduced pharmaceutical inventions would not have been developed without patents \u2014 a share that reached 0% in textiles and motor vehicles. Drug development costs exceed $2 billion per approved compound; any competitor can replicate the molecule at marginal cost once it is disclosed. Without patent-backed exclusivity, rational capital simply does not fund that risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: CBO (2021)<\/a> \u00b7 Health Affairs (2015), citing Mansfield (1986)<\/a> \u00b7 Williams (2016), PMC\/NIH<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Boldrin & Levine’s prescription is empirically untested and logically circular.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Even the 2013 paper concedes a “partial equilibrium” positive incentive effect. The authors never identify a modern patent-free economy that outperforms patent-protected ones in R&D intensity \u2014 because no such economy exists. Heidi Williams’ comprehensive review (PMC\/NIH, 2016)<\/a> concludes the relationship is positive, sector-variable, and strongest in industries where development costs are highest. Edith Penrose identified the logical trap in 1951: it is far easier to argue against a theoretical construct than to demonstrate that abolishing an existing institution produces better outcomes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Boldrin & Levine (2013)<\/a> \u00b7 Williams (2016), PMC\/NIH<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 2 \u2014 High Public Resonance: Patents Create Monopolies That Harm Consumers via High Drug Prices<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Patent-protected drug monopolies allow companies to charge prices far beyond competitive market levels, placing life-saving medications out of reach. The COVID-19 vaccine debate became the most visible flashpoint: Moderna and Pfizer held tight IP protections while global supply remained constrained. Jonas Salk’s decision not to patent the polio vaccine \u2014 enabling immediate global production \u2014 is invoked as the moral counterpoint. The argument extends beyond pharma: clean energy patents prevent developing nations from decarbonizing, creating “clean energy apartheid.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: NYT (2022)<\/a> \u00b7 Gizmodo\/Earther (2021)<\/a> \u00b7 Common Dreams (2022)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. Without exclusivity, the drugs that appear “too expensive” would not exist at all.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The biopharmaceutical R&D process is uniquely capital-intensive: average development costs exceed $2 billion per approved molecule, clinical failure rates run at 90%, and timelines span 12\u201315 years. The Congressional Budget Office (2021)<\/a> confirms that patent-based exclusivity is the primary mechanism making this investment commercially viable. Without it, rational capital simply would not fund the risk. Critics who use drug pricing to indict the entire patent system are attacking the wrong mechanism \u2014 the reform target is downstream pricing policy and reimbursement frameworks, not the IP right that funded the development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: CBO (2021)<\/a> \u00b7 Health Affairs (2015)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. The Salk example is systematically misused.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Jonas Salk’s polio vaccine was developed primarily with public funds at a university in a 1950s environment with negligible approval costs by modern standards. The COVID-19 mRNA vaccines were developed in under twelve months for a novel pathogen, largely with private capital at extraordinary risk. These are incomparable situations. Furthermore, the actual bottleneck to global vaccine rollout was not patents but manufacturing capacity, cold-chain infrastructure, and regulatory harmonization. Moderna and Pfizer both offered licensing arrangements; distribution lagged because of infrastructure, not IP. Former USPTO Directors David Kappos (IP Fridays, Ep. 143)<\/a> and Andrei Iancu stated publicly at the Council for Innovation Promotion (2022) that extending the TRIPS IP waiver was counterproductive for exactly these reasons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources:\u00a0IP Fridays Ep. 143 (Kappos)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 Council for Innovation Promotion (2022)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. The pricing problem is a market structure problem \u2014 not a patent problem.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

US drug prices are dramatically higher than German ones not because patent terms differ but because the US lacks central price negotiation. Germany’s mandatory health technology assessment under AMNOG (2011)<\/a> requires demonstrating added therapeutic benefit for any product seeking premium reimbursement; drugs without proven benefit receive only reference pricing. The RAND\/ASPE drug pricing study (2022)<\/a> found US brand-name drug prices were 278% of OECD comparison-country prices \u2014 driven by market structure, not patent law. Same molecule, same patent, dramatically different prices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: AMNOG \/ Global Legal Insights<\/a> \u00b7 PMC AMNOG 10-year analysis (2023)<\/a> \u00b7 RAND\/ASPE drug pricing (2022)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 3 \u2014 High Practical Resonance: Patent Trolls \/ NPEs Abuse the System<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs), also called patent assertion entities or “patent trolls,” accumulate large patent portfolios not to innovate but to extract settlement fees from operating companies. Studies show NPEs accounted for 63\u201373% of all US patent litigation in 2022. Firms that lose to NPEs reduce R&D by roughly 20%. Direct annual defendant costs were estimated at $29 billion in 2012. Only five cents of every dollar in NPE damages flows back to actual inventors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources:\u00a0ProMarket \/ Stigler Center (2024)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 Bessen & Meurer (2014)<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0R Street Institute (2025)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. NPE abuse is a correctable enforcement pathology, not a structural indictment of patents.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

NPE litigation has declined significantly following post-Alice case law, PTAB inter partes review proceedings, and the Supreme Court’s TC Heartland (2017) decision, which ended venue shopping. These abuses arose from specific, identifiable legislative and judicial choices \u2014 all of which have been substantially corrected. Former USPTO Director Andrei Iancu stated at IPAS 2025<\/a>: “No rational businessperson would ever support the idea of deleting all IP law unless their limited business interests would benefit economically from depressing the value of American innovation.” The right response is targeted enforcement reform \u2014 which the PREVAIL and RESTORE Acts are now pursuing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources:\u00a0IPWatchdog, Iancu IPAS 2025<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 TC Heartland (2017)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Removing patents does not remove NPEs \u2014 it removes the startups that need patents to defend themselves.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The\u00a0National Law Review \/ Sedona Conference (2025)<\/a>\u00a0makes the structural point plainly: large tech incumbents like Google, Meta, and Amazon do not need patents to dominate \u2014 their moats are network effects, proprietary data, and trade secrets. An SME manufacturer or biotech startup has none of those advantages. Patents are precisely their tool for resisting encroachment by larger players. If patents are weakened, NPEs will pivot to trade secret and copyright claims \u2014 but the small inventor will have lost their primary weapon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: National Law Review \/ Sedona Conference (2025)<\/a> \u00b7 EUIPO\/EPO Startup Finance (2023)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. The empirical benefit to patent holders dwarfs NPE litigation costs for most companies.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The NBER “patent lottery” study (Farre-Mensa et al., 2020)<\/a>, which exploited the quasi-random assignment of patent examiners to isolate causal effects, found that obtaining a first patent caused startups to grow 55% faster in employment and 80% faster in sales over five years \u2014 and more than doubled the probability of an IPO. This positive effect, experienced by the overwhelming majority of patent holders who are operating companies, vastly outweighs the NPE litigation costs borne by a minority. The NPE problem is real. But it is no more an argument for abolishing patents than fraud in a specific market sector is an argument for abolishing contracts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Farre-Mensa et al. NBER (2020)<\/a> \u00b7 EUIPO\/EPO Startup Finance (2023)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 4: Patent Thickets Block Follow-On Innovation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

An interlocking web of overlapping patents \u2014 particularly in software, semiconductors, and biotechnology \u2014 creates a minefield that blocks competitors and researchers from building on prior art. The explosion of patent filings in the 1990s created “patent thickets” that slow cumulative innovation. One frequently cited study of human gene patents demonstrated reduced subsequent research in affected genetic domains after patents were granted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources:\u00a0Wikipedia, Criticism of Patents<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 National Academy of Sciences (2004)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. The thicket argument is sector-specific and historically bounded.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

WIPO’s case study analysis (2015)<\/a>\u00a0of six breakthrough and emerging technologies found no indication that high patent filing volumes in 3D printing, nanotechnology, or robotics caused increased litigation or friction. Semiconductor and telecom companies resolved thicket problems through cross-licensing pools (MPEG-LA, Via Licensing) and FRAND frameworks. In most mechanical engineering and specialty chemical sectors \u2014 the SME core domain \u2014 patent thickets are not a meaningful operational problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: WIPO World IP Report (2015)<\/a> \u00b7 OECD (2004)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Patent disclosure is the antidote to thickets, not the cause.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Every patent in a “thicket” is simultaneously a detailed technical publication that engineers can design around, license, or build upon. Without the patent system, that technical knowledge would reside as trade secrets, permanently unavailable to follow-on innovators. The choice is not between thickets and free cumulative innovation \u2014 it is between thickets with full public disclosure and permanent secrecy with no design-around possibility. Freedom-to-operate (FTO) analysis navigates thickets effectively. But you cannot design around a trade secret you cannot see.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: WIPO Economic Development & Patents<\/a> \u00b7 Williams (2016)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Thicket problems are a patent quality failure \u2014 and quality is improving.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The genomics thicket studies reflect an era of overly broad grants at the USPTO in the 1990s and early 2000s. The Supreme Court’s Mayo and Alice decisions, post-grant oppositions at the EPO and PTAB, and improving examination standards have substantially narrowed such patents. OECD data (2004)<\/a> shows that EPO post-grant opposition proceedings are an efficient quality control mechanism: between 1981 and 1998, 8.6% of EPO grants were opposed, with one third revoked.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources:\u00a0OECD (2004)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 Supreme Court Mayo<\/a>\/Alice <\/a>decisions<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 5: The Patent System Is Captured by Incumbent Interests<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Boldrin and Levine argue that patent systems are captured by political economy dynamics: once any IP protection exists, holders lobby for ever-stronger rights. The result is a ratchet \u2014 patent systems only grow stronger and more expensive regardless of social welfare. Jack Dorsey’s and Elon Musk’s 2025 calls to “delete all IP law” gave this structural critique a populist platform.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: Boldrin & Levine (2013)<\/a> \u00b7 National Law Review (2025)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. The post-2006 record directly contradicts the ratchet thesis.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The US record since 2006 systematically contradicts the “only grows stronger” prediction: eBay (2006) restricted injunctions; Alice\/Mayo (2012\u20132014) drastically narrowed eligibility; the AIA (2011) created the PTAB, which invalidated thousands of large-company claims; TC Heartland (2017) ended venue shopping. Former USPTO Director Iancu stated at IPAS 2025<\/a> that the direction of the past 20 years has been predominantly toward weakening patent rights. The system can, and does, reform itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: IPWatchdog, Iancu IPAS 2025<\/a> \u00b7 CSIS (2024)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. The largest beneficiaries of patent abolition would be incumbents, not innovators.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

As the\u00a0National Law Review \/ Sedona Conference (2025)<\/a>\u00a0observes, Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Tesla already dominate through scale, data monopolies, and network effects \u2014 not patents. Their proposal to delete IP law reads less like a call for open innovation and more like an effort to pull up the ladder. LLM and AI providers specifically rely on trade secrets that startups cannot replicate. For an SME manufacturer or biotech startup, patents are the equalizer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: National Law Review \/ Sedona Conference (2025)<\/a> \u00b7 IPWatchdog, Iancu (2025)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Weaker Western patent rights primarily benefit China.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The National Security Commission on AI Final Report<\/a> and CSIS (2024)<\/a> document that every US weakening of patent rights has created a strategic vacuum that China is deliberately filling by strengthening its own IP regime. China overtook the US as the leading PCT filer at WIPO in 2019. A European SME that dismisses patent protection as “captured politics” is making a unilateral disarmament decision while its Chinese competitors file more and stronger patents every year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: NSCAI Final Report, Ch. 12<\/a> \u00b7 CSIS (2024)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 6: Patents Harm Global Health and Developing Nations<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Strict patent protections in pharma and clean energy create “vaccine apartheid” and prevent developing nations from manufacturing life-saving drugs at affordable prices. The TRIPS Agreement is criticized for imposing strong patent standards on countries that lack the manufacturing base to benefit from them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: Gizmodo\/Earther (2021)<\/a> \u00b7 Common Dreams (2022)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. The access problem in developing nations is primarily affordability and infrastructure \u2014 not patents.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

For most essential medicines, patents have already expired in the developing world \u2014 through time, TRIPS flexibilities, or compulsory licensing. The medicines unavailable in Sub-Saharan Africa are largely off-patent. The barrier is manufacturing capacity, regulatory approval, cold chain logistics, and purchasing power. Even after the limited TRIPS COVID vaccine waiver was granted in 2022, uptake in low-income countries did not meaningfully accelerate \u2014 because the bottleneck was cold chain and healthcare infrastructure, not IP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: PLOS Medicine (2022)<\/a> \u00b7 WTO TRIPS waiver implementation review (2022)<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0European Journal of Health Economics (2011)<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0Expert Opin Ther Pat (2021)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Patents incentivize the R&D that produces the drugs in the first place.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Without patent-based incentives, pharmaceutical companies would not develop medicines for diseases prevalent in developing markets. The Advance Market Commitment (AMC) model for pneumococcal vaccines demonstrated that pull mechanisms leveraging IP-protected products can deliver vaccines to developing markets at affordable prices. The correct conclusion is not “abolish patents” but “complement patents with tiered pricing, AMCs, and public-private partnerships.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Orphan Drug Act data<\/a> \u00b7 GAVI\/Gates AMC case studies<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0ScienceDirect Pharma Innovation Incentives (2022)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Countries that weakened patents have not gained meaningful innovation capacity.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The Yi Quan (2008, Kellogg School) study cited by critics showed TRIPS did not increase domestic pharmaceutical innovation in low-income countries \u2014 unsurprising, because the constraint is the absence of a domestic R&D infrastructure, not patent law. India’s generics pharmaceutical industry operates by exploiting the public disclosure function of patents to produce off-patent drugs. It free-rides on the patent system’s technical disclosure, which is evidence in favour of patents’ public benefit, not against them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Yi Qian (2007), Kellogg School<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0ScienceDirect (2022)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 7: Low-Quality \/ Trivially Obvious Patents Are Routinely Granted<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Patent offices \u2014 particularly the USPTO during the 1990s and 2000s \u2014 routinely granted patents on obvious or trivially incremental innovations. Boldrin and Levine cite examples: patents on “swinging a swing,” “poking objects through the fifth dimension,” and Amazon’s one-click shopping. Critics argue patent examiners face institutional pressure to lower standards, creating an ever-growing inventory of worthless but legally dangerous patents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: Boldrin & Levine (2013)<\/a> \u00b7 Springer\/IIC Patent Quality Critique (2024)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. The EPO applies one of the strictest examination standards in the world.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The “silly patent” examples critics cite are overwhelmingly US patents from a specific era.\u00a0OECD (2004)<\/a>\u00a0documents that EPO’s post-grant opposition system functions as an efficient quality filter: between 1981 and 1998, 8.6% of EPO grants were opposed, with one third revoked and another third amended. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources:\u00a0OECD (2004)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 EPO examination guidelines<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Post-grant review mechanisms have dramatically improved quality.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The America Invents Act (2011) created IPR and PGR proceedings at the PTAB specifically to challenge low-quality patents. In Europe, the Unified Patent Court (UPC, launched June 2023)<\/a> provides a new central revocation mechanism across 18 EU member states. Critics who cite 1990s examples are describing a system that has subsequently reformed itself substantially through exactly the democratic and judicial channels Boldrin and Levine claim do not function.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: AIA (2011)<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0UPC (2023)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 EPO opposition statistics<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. The alternative \u2014 no patents \u2014 produces unbreakable trade secret monopolies.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The Coca-Cola formula, kept secret for over 130 years, represents an infinite monopoly with zero disclosure obligation, zero public benefit, and no post-grant challenge procedure. Low-quality patents are worse than good patents \u2014 but they are still better than trade secrets: they expire, can be challenged via opposition, and must be publicly disclosed. Trade secret monopolies do none of these things.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources:\u00a0NSCAI Report on trade secrets<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 WIPO trade secret page<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 8: Software and Business Method Patents Are Particularly Harmful<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Software patents primarily entrench large incumbents and feed NPEs rather than incentivizing development. Innovation cycles are fast, R&D costs are low, and the marginal cost of copying code is zero. NPR’s Planet Money (Episode 551, 2014) presented economists arguing we should get rid of patents altogether, with software as the primary exhibit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources:\u00a0NPR Planet Money, Ep. 551 (2014)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 Bessen & Hunt (software patents research)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. The Supreme Court has substantially corrected the software patent problem.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank decision (2014) significantly narrowed patent eligibility for abstract-idea software implementations. CSIS (2024)<\/a> estimates that VC investment in patent-intensive sectors including software fell from 50% (2004) to 28% (2017), suggesting Alice overcorrected \u2014 making it an argument for restoring balance, not for further restriction. Former Director Iancu (IPWatchdog, 2025)<\/a> specifically called for legislative clarification of Section 101 to restore certainty without re-opening pre-Alice era abuses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank (2014)<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0CSIS (2024)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7\u00a0IPWatchdog, Iancu (2025)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Europe excluded software patents and did not produce a dominant software industry.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The European Patent Convention explicitly excludes software “as such” from patentability (EPC Art. 52). If software patents were purely harmful, Europe should dominate global software markets. It does not. The US, where software patents were broadly available until Alice, produced the world’s dominant software ecosystem. The EUIPO\/EPO startup finance study (2023)<\/a> confirms that patent-holding startups are more than twice as likely to achieve a successful exit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: EPC Art. 52<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0EUIPO\/EPO Startup Finance (2023)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Fast innovation cycles reduce monopoly effects without eliminating a patent’s signaling value.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Fast cycles mean that follow-on innovators can quickly design around or supersede a patent \u2014 reducing the actual monopoly effect to near zero in most software cases while preserving the patent’s value as a fundraising and credibility signal. The NBER patent lottery study<\/a> shows this signaling effect is largest for startups with first-time founders outside major hubs. A patent does not need to create a lasting monopoly to create enormous startup value \u2014 it needs only to close the next funding round.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Farre-Mensa et al. NBER (2020)<\/a> \u00b7 EUIPO\/EPO Startup Finance (2023)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 9: Prize Systems and Government Grants Would Work Better<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Government prizes, direct R&D grants, and open-source models can replace patents as innovation incentives without creating monopolies. Jonas Salk’s polio vaccine and the globally coordinated influenza vaccine system \u2014 both developed without IP considerations \u2014 are cited as proof. Economists like Michael Kremer have developed formal models for government “patent buyouts” allowing immediate open publication.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources:\u00a0Gizmodo\/Earther (2021)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 Kremer (1998), patent buyout model<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0Science Business (IP debate)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. Prize systems have a 200-year track record of failing to replace market-based innovation at scale.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The prize concept was seriously proposed and rejected in the great 19th-century British patent abolition campaign, and periodically since, without ever displacing the patent system anywhere. Prizes work for well-defined, near-term challenges but systematically fail to generate sustained speculative long-term R&D. The mRNA platform technology \u2014 developed through decades of basic research before any pandemic application was foreseeable \u2014 would never have attracted a prize because nobody knew what to offer a prize for.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose (1950)<\/a> \u00b7 Kremer (1998) patent buyout model<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0HBS Nicholas (2013)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Government grants fund research; patents fund commercialization \u2014 they are complementary, not competing.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Government R&D grants produce important basic research but have a poor track record in commercialization. The EUIPO\/EPO (2026)<\/a> finding that 88% of European VC investment goes to IPR-intensive companies is direct evidence that private capital allocates risk investment based on IP protection, not grant support. Eliminating patents in favour of grants removes the mechanism that converts public research into marketable products.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: EUIPO\/EPO (2026)<\/a> \u00b7 CBO (2021)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Even the primary advocates for alternatives accept that patents are irreplaceable for most industries.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Boldrin and Levine’s own 2013 paper<\/a> explicitly carves out exceptions for pharmaceuticals and sectors with high fixed R&D costs. Every serious prize-system proposal similarly addresses defined failure modes rather than proposing full patent replacement. If the proponents of alternatives themselves accept that patents are irreplaceable for most industrial innovation, the “abolish patents” position dissolves into an argument for targeted complementary reforms \u2014 which patent advocates already support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources:\u00a0Boldrin & Levine (2013)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 Kremer (1998), patent buyout model<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0ScienceDirect (2022)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n
Need help with patents? Contact me!<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 10: Ideas Cannot Be “Owned” \u2014 Patents Are Philosophically Incoherent<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Thomas Jefferson argued in 1813 that “inventions cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.” Adam Smith condemned exclusive privileges as distortions creating artificial scarcities in non-scarce goods. The libertarian tradition holds that applying property rights to non-rivalrous goods (ideas) is conceptually wrong: unlike physical property, an idea is not diminished by being shared. Musk and Dorsey’s 2025 “delete all IP” position draws directly on this tradition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: Jefferson to McPherson (1813)<\/a> \u00b7 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0National Law Review (2025)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. Patents are not property in the absolute sense \u2014 at least in the US, they are a constitutionally grounded social bargain.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Jefferson, while skeptical of permanent monopolies, designed the first US patent act and granted the first US patents. He understood patents not as natural property rights but as deliberate policy instruments. The social contract is explicit: full technical disclosure of the invention in exchange for a bounded, time-limited exclusive right \u2014 currently 20 years from filing. The US Constitution (Art. I, Section 8, Clause 8) explicitly authorises Congress to grant this right “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” This is not owning an idea \u2014 it is a temporary licence from the public in exchange for a concrete public benefit: disclosure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: US Constitution Art. I, Section 8, Cl. 8<\/a> \u00b7 Jefferson to McPherson (1813)<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0National Law Review (2025)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. All property rights are social constructs \u2014 the philosophical objection proves too much.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The argument that non-rivalrous goods cannot be owned applies with equal force to copyright, trademarks, contractual rights, corporate shares, and financial instruments \u2014 none of which involve physical possession. No serious political economist advocates abolishing all of these on philosophical grounds. The relevant question is always whether the social institution produces net benefits. For patents, the empirical record from credible institutional sources \u2014 EUIPO\/EPO (2026)<\/a>, NBER startup studies, CBO pharmaceutical analysis \u2014 strongly answers yes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: EUIPO\/EPO (2026)<\/a> \u00b7 General property rights theory<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. The “ideas should be free” argument privileges copiers over creators.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

A world where the first inventor bears all R&D costs and every subsequent imitator incurs only marginal production costs is a world that systematically under-invests in invention. This is the standard public goods problem that patent law exists to address. The philosophical critique amounts to arguing that R&D investment deserves no return beyond first-mover advantage \u2014 a position that is elegant in theory and catastrophically wrong in practice when R&D timelines are 10 years and first-mover advantages last 18 months. Nordhaus’s 1969 optimal patent model formalised this trade-off, and WIPO’s economic analysis<\/a> confirms the same logic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Nordhaus (1969), optimal patent model<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0WIPO Economic Development & Patents<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7\u00a0CBO (2021)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 11: Patents Favor Large Corporations Over Small Inventors<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Obtaining, maintaining, and enforcing patents requires resources that large firms have and small firms do not. J\u00f6rg Sprave, a prolific YouTube inventor with over 30 years of experience with patent lawyers and courts, argues that the best patent attorneys are on retainer at large corporations and unavailable to small inventors, leaving them with below-average counsel and weak patents that create disclosure risk without defensible protection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: J\u00f6rg Sprave, Slingshot Channel<\/a> \u00b7 National Law Review (2025)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. The empirical evidence on startups and patents is overwhelmingly positive.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The NBER “patent lottery” study (Farre-Mensa et al., 2020)<\/a> used quasi-random assignment of patent examiners to isolate causal effects: obtaining a first patent caused startups to grow 55% faster in employment and 80% faster in sales over five years, increased the probability of VC funding by 47%, increased access to patent-backed loans by 76%, and more than doubled the probability of an IPO. The effect was strongest for first-time founders outside major startup hubs. The EUIPO\/EPO Startup Finance study (2023)<\/a> confirms patent-holding European startups are more than twice as likely to achieve a successful exit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Farre-Mensa et al. NBER (2020)<\/a> \u00b7 EUIPO\/EPO Startup Finance (2023)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. European fee structures and the SME Fund have substantially reduced access barriers.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The EPO and EUIPO offer up to 65% fee reductions for SMEs and individuals under the\u00a0EU IP SME Fund<\/a>. The Unitary Patent (launched June 2023) provides a single registration covering up to 18 EU member states at dramatically lower cost than the sum of national filings, with strong SME uptake: over 75,000 Unitary Patents registered as of December 2025. Also, I am partner of Michalski H\u00fcttermann & Partner<\/a> and we work for sole inventors and large corporations alike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources:\u00a0EUIPO SME Fund<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 Unitary Patent statistics (December 2025)<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0UPC Agreement<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. A patent is the only legal tool that gives a small inventor the right to stop a large corporation.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Without a patent, a two-person startup that invents a new manufacturing process has no legal mechanism preventing BASF or Siemens from adopting it the next day. Trade secret law requires secrecy, which is incompatible with selling products. Copyright does not protect technical innovations. Only a patent grants a small company the right to send a legally grounded cease-and-desist letter to a Fortune 500 corporation. The critique that patents “favor large corporations” has the causality precisely backwards: it is the absence of patents that definitively and permanently favors large corporations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: National Law Review (2025)<\/a> \u00b7 IPWatchdog, Iancu (2025)<\/a> \u00b7 IP Fridays Ep. 143 (Kappos)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 12: Pharma Evergreening Extends Monopolies Beyond Their Legitimate Term<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Pharmaceutical companies make minor, obvious modifications to existing drugs \u2014 new dosage forms, new salts, extended-release formulations \u2014 and obtain new patents to block generic entry long after the original innovation period has passed. This “evergreening” or “product hopping” extends monopoly pricing without meaningful clinical benefit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: NYT (2022)<\/a> \u00b7 R Street Institute (2025)<\/a> \u00b7 Common Dreams (2022)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. Evergreening is a misuse of a tool \u2014 existing reforms address it without abolition.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Both the CBO (2021)<\/a> and R Street Institute<\/a> acknowledge that product-hopping and secondary-use patents on minor reformulations are a real concern. But these are practices that existing antitrust law, FDA exclusivity rules, and PTAB inter partes review proceedings are specifically designed to address. The existence of a legal instrument being misused is not an argument for abolishing the instrument \u2014 it is an argument for better enforcement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: CBO (2021)<\/a> \u00b7 R Street Institute (2025)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Germany’s AMNOG process already neutralises evergreening’s pricing effects without touching patents.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Germany’s mandatory health technology assessment (Nutzenbewertung) under AMNOG<\/a> requires pharmaceutical companies to demonstrate added therapeutic benefit for any product seeking premium reimbursement. A reformulation or line extension with no meaningful clinical benefit receives only reference pricing. ScienceDirect (2017)<\/a> confirms: by law, substances without added benefit cannot exceed comparator drug costs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: AMNOG \/ Global Legal Insights<\/a> \u00b7 ScienceDirect (2017)<\/a> \u00b7 PMC AMNOG analysis (2023)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Secondary patents on genuinely improved formulations serve a real public benefit.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Extended-release formulations, improved bioavailability profiles, and combination therapies frequently represent genuine clinical value \u2014 better tolerability, reduced dosing frequency, lower overdose risk. These are real innovations deserving protection. EPO and DPMA examination standards apply the inventive step test rigorously to secondary claims; those lacking genuine technical advance do not survive examination or opposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: EPO examination guidelines on second medical use<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0Health Affairs (2015)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 13: Patents Historically Concentrated Corporate Power<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

US antitrust investigations of the 1930s and 1940s documented how patent pools and cross-licensing arrangements in chemicals, oil, and automobiles concentrated market control and suppressed rivals. Contemporary critics draw a direct parallel to Big Tech’s accumulation of patent portfolios as market-entry barriers against smaller competitors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources:\u00a0Grokipedia, Criticism of Patents<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 B. Zorina Khan (GMU) historical analysis<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. The early US patent system was specifically designed to democratise innovation access.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

B. Zorina Khan’s economic history work (George Mason University), cited in HBS Nicholas (2013)<\/a>, documents that the early US patent system was deliberately designed to allow farmers, craftsmen, and small entrepreneurs to compete with established manufacturers. The 19th-century US patent system had dramatically higher participation rates from ordinary citizens than the British system, and is credited with driving American industrial development precisely because it was not reserved for well-capitalised incumbents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: \u00a0HBS Nicholas (2013)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Modern antitrust law, not patent abolition, is the correct response.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The Standard Oil-era patent pool abuses were addressed not by abolishing patents but by antitrust enforcement: the AT&T consent decree, DOJ actions against chemical industry pools, and subsequent regulations requiring FRAND licensing for standard-essential patents. The EU’s SEP Framework (2024) and ongoing ETSI standardisation governance provide modern instruments for the same problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: AT&T consent decree<\/a> \u00b7 EU SEP Framework (2024)<\/a> \u00b7 FRAND licensing case law<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Chinese patent accumulation is the most compelling contemporary counter-example.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Chinese companies \u2014 Huawei, CATL, BYD, BOE \u2014 now assert large, high-quality patent portfolios aggressively in European and US markets. CSIS (2024)<\/a> and Caldwell Law (2025)<\/a> document this shift in detail. If Western SMEs abandon patents on historical grounds, they face Chinese competitors with aggressive and enforceable IP portfolios. The asymmetry is not between big corporations and small inventors \u2014 it is between a country that takes patents seriously and companies that do not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: CSIS (2024)<\/a> \u00b7 Caldwell Law (2025)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 14: Innovation Happens Perfectly Well Without Patents<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Critics point to industries with rapid innovation where patents play no role: fashion, cuisine, stand-up comedy, open-source software. Historical evidence from the Industrial Revolution shows innovation flourishing with weak patent enforcement. The wheel, the domestication of wolves into dogs \u2014 neither required a patent. Innovation is a fundamental human drive that predates and transcends intellectual property systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: Gizmodo\/Earther (2021)<\/a> \u00b7 Boldrin & Levine (2013)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. Fashion, food, and comedy are sectors with inherently low R&D costs \u2014 making them irrelevant to capital-intensive innovation.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The sectors where patents matter most \u2014 pharmaceuticals, specialty chemicals, biotech, precision instruments, advanced manufacturing \u2014 have development costs in the hundreds of millions to billions, timelines of 5\u201315 years, and immediate imitability once a product enters the market. As Health Affairs (2015)<\/a> and CBO (2021)<\/a> document, in the sectors that matter most for economic growth, patent protection is essential.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Health Affairs (2015)<\/a> \u00b7 CBO (2021)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Open-source software is a copyright-based instrument \u2014 not evidence against IP.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The Linux kernel and major open-source projects operate under GPL \u2014 a copyright licence. The Open Invention Network (OIN)<\/a> \u2014 with 4,100+ member companies and millions of patents \u2014 exists specifically to defend Linux from patent aggression using patents as a shield. Microsoft joined OIN<\/a> contributing its 60,000+ patent portfolio to protect open-source software. Sophisticated open innovators use IP strategically as a defensive tool.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Open Invention Network<\/a> \u00b7 Microsoft OIN membership<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. German Hidden Champions build competitive moats specifically through patent portfolios.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Germany’s approximately 1,300 world market leaders in niche industrial and technology sectors \u2014 what Hermann Simon calls “Hidden Champions” \u2014 consistently rely on patent portfolios as a core competitive tool. A hydraulic systems manufacturer in the Rhineland cannot maintain a 40% global market share through first-mover advantage alone; Chinese competitors will reverse-engineer the product design within 18 months without legal barriers. The EUIPO\/EPO (2026)<\/a> confirms Germany has above-average shares of patent-intensive employment among major EU economies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Hermann Simon, Hidden Champions research<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0EUIPO\/EPO (2026)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 15: Patent Litigation Is Pure Dead-Weight Economic Loss<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Resources spent on patent lawyers, courts, and settlements represent pure economic waste: no goods or services are produced. Bessen and Meurer estimate US NPE litigation cost defendant firms $29 billion per year in direct costs in 2012, destroying $60 billion in aggregate firm value annually. The patent game’s primary beneficiaries, critics argue, are patent offices, patent attorneys, and rent-seeking patentees \u2014 not consumers or innovators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: Bessen & Meurer (2014)<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0Boldrin & Levine (2013)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. Litigation cost as a share of value created is negligible.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The EUIPO\/EPO (2026)<\/a> documents that patent-intensive industries generate \u20ac7.7 trillion of EU GDP. Even accepting the critics’ largest US litigation cost estimates, the ratio of litigation cost to economic value created by the patent system is well under 0.5%. The vast majority of granted patents are never litigated; they function as signalling instruments, licensing assets, and competitive deterrents without a single court appearance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: EUIPO\/EPO (2026)<\/a> \u00b7 R Street Institute (2025)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Without patents, disputes would migrate to more expensive and less predictable legal instruments.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Trade secret misappropriation litigation, tortious interference claims, and unfair competition suits are all more expensive and less predictable than patent disputes because the underlying rights are less clearly defined. Patent law’s formal claim definition makes disputes more bounded and resolvable. Countries with weak patent systems have not seen lower IP dispute rates \u2014 they have seen higher rates of industrial espionage, misappropriation, and informal competitive conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources:\u00a0NSCAI Report on trade secrets<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 China IP litigation data<\/a> \u00b7 WIPO dispute resolution<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. The option to litigate is what gives a patent its innovation-incentive value.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The NBER patent lottery study (Farre-Mensa et al., 2020)<\/a> shows that the mere grant of a patent \u2014 increasing the credible threat of litigation \u2014 causes startup employment and sales to accelerate dramatically, without a single lawsuit being filed. The option value of enforcement, not its actual exercise, is what drives investment decisions. A patent system without enforceable litigation rights is not a reformed system \u2014 it is a valueless piece of paper.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Farre-Mensa et al. NBER (2020)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 16: Gene Patents and “Patents on Life” Are Ethically Objectionable<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Patenting genes, living organisms, seeds, or biological processes raises ethical objections about commodifying nature. The Myriad Genetics breast cancer gene patent \u2014 which critics argued restricted access to genetic testing \u2014 is the canonical case. Broader objections hold that allowing monopoly rights over biological sequences places private profit above human health and natural heritage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: Gizmodo\/Earther (2021)<\/a> \u00b7 Wikipedia, Criticism of Patents<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. Courts have already substantially restricted gene patents on exactly these ethical grounds.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The US Supreme Court’s Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (2013) held that naturally occurring DNA sequences are not patentable subject matter. The EPO’s Biotech Directive (98\/44\/EC)<\/a> and EPC Art. 53 similarly restrict patents on naturally occurring biological phenomena. The ethical concern has been heard and acted upon within the existing legal framework \u2014 through targeted judicial and legislative correction, not system abolition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Myriad Genetics (2013)<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0EPO Biotech Directive (98\/44\/EC)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 EPC Art. 53<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Synthetic and engineered biological innovations are legitimate patent subjects representing billions in R&D.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Critics conflate naturally occurring gene sequences (correctly unpatentable) with synthetically modified DNA, novel CRISPR therapeutic constructs, and engineered proteins \u2014 all products of genuine inventive activity. CRISPR-based therapies, mRNA vaccines, and CAR-T cell therapies represent tens of billions of euros in R&D investment that would not exist without patent protection. The Broad Institute’s CRISPR patent portfolio has driven an entire therapeutic industry into existence in less than a decade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Broad Institute CRISPR patents<\/a> \u00b7 EPO examination guidelines<\/a> \u00b7 mRNA vaccine patent case studies<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. EPC Art. 53 already handles genuine ethical boundaries in a legally principled way.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The philosophical objection to patenting living organisms is inconsistently applied: many who oppose pharmaceutical gene patents support plant variety protections for organic agriculture and geographical indications for artisanal food. EPC Art. 53 provides a principled mechanism: inventions whose commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality are not patentable. This provision addresses genuine ethical boundaries without requiring the abolition of all biotech patent protection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: EPC Art. 53<\/a> \u00b7 EPO examination guidelines<\/a> \u00b7 TRIPS Art. 27.2<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 17 \u2014 From Practitioner Experience: Affordable Patent Lawyers Are Not Good Enough \u2014 The “Wrong Attorney” Problem<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

J\u00f6rg Sprave, inventor and YouTube creator with over 30 years of experience dealing with patent lawyers and courts, argues that the best patent attorneys are on retainer at large corporations and unavailable to small inventors. The affordable ones lack the technical and legal depth to draft bulletproof applications. The result: small inventors end up with weak patents that create disclosure risk without defensible protection \u2014 a worse outcome than not filing at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: J\u00f6rg Sprave, Slingshot Channel (YouTube)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. The problem is real \u2014 but it proves the need for better attorney selection, not patent abolition.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Sprave is correct that attorney quality dramatically affects outcomes \u2014 and that a bad patent is worse than no patent. But this is true of every professional service: the wrong surgeon, architect, or tax advisor produces bad results. The solution is not to abolish the profession \u2014 it is to choose the right professional for your situation. An SME company or independent inventor who selects an attorney with sector-specific expertise, a track record at the EPO or DPMA, and experience with SME clients will have a fundamentally different experience than one chosen on cost alone. The\u00a0IP Fridays podcast<\/a>\u00a0has addressed exactly this selection challenge across multiple episodes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources:\u00a0IP Fridays podcast<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 EPO attorney directory<\/a> \u00b7 Patentanwaltskammer<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. European patent attorneys meet mandatory state qualification standards.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Becoming a European Patent Attorney (EPA) or German Patentanwalt requires passing the European Qualifying Examinations (EQE)<\/a> or the German state examination \u2014 multi-year, technically and legally rigorous processes with low pass rates. The DPMA Patentanwaltsordnung<\/a> mandates continuing professional education and ethical compliance. Sprave’s experience reflects a US context where entry requirements are substantially lower.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: EPO EQE structure<\/a> \u00b7 DPMA Patentanwaltsordnung<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. The cost of quality prosecution is recoverable many times over.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

A well-drafted patent with strong claims creates a quantifiable asset. The Farre-Mensa NBER study<\/a> shows a first patent more than doubles a startup’s IPO probability. The EUIPO\/EPO startup finance study (2023)<\/a> shows patent-holding startups are more than twice as likely to achieve a successful exit. For a typical EPO prosecution \u2014 a mechanical or chemical case running \u20ac8,000\u2013\u20ac15,000 through grant \u2014 these represent a highly favourable return on investment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Farre-Mensa et al. NBER (2020)<\/a> \u00b7 EUIPO\/EPO Startup Finance (2023)<\/a> \u00b7 EPO official fee calculator<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 18 \u2014 From Practitioner Experience: Disclosure Without Enforcement Is the Worst Possible Outcome<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

J\u00f6rg Sprave identifies a specific practical trap: patent law requires public disclosure of the invention in sufficient technical detail. If the patent is not granted, is successfully challenged, or cannot be enforced \u2014 particularly against overseas manufacturers \u2014 the inventor has handed competitors a detailed blueprint at no cost to them. The small inventor ends up with no monopoly protection but full public disclosure: the worst of all worlds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: J\u00f6rg Sprave, Slingshot Channel (YouTube)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. This is an argument for strategic IP planning, not against patents.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Sprave’s concern is valid as a risk management point but reaches the wrong conclusion. Patents filed primarily as business development signals \u2014 VC fundraising, licensing negotiation, deterrence \u2014 do not need to be enforced to generate substantial value. The NBER patent lottery data<\/a> quantifies this precisely: the mere grant of a patent accelerates startup growth dramatically, without a single enforcement action. A patent without an enforcement strategy needs a defensive purpose to justify filing \u2014 which is exactly what experienced patent counsel assess before recommending filing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: EUIPO\/EPO Startup Finance (2023)<\/a> \u00b7 NBER patent lottery (2020)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Trade secrecy offers no better protection for manufactured products.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

An inventor who keeps a physical product secret gains nothing once it is commercially released: a competitor can buy it, reverse-engineer it, and copy it legally \u2014 because there is no patent to infringe. Trade secrecy protects only processes that cannot be reverse-engineered \u2014 a far narrower category. For a crossbow design that can be purchased and examined, or a machine component that can be measured and replicated, secrecy provides zero protection the moment the product enters the market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: IP law doctrine on reverse engineering<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0DPMA patent strategy guidance<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Defensive publication provides a third path \u2014 block competitors without enforcement burden.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

An inventor who does not wish to enforce a patent but wants to prevent others from patenting the same invention can file a patent application and allow it to publish \u2014 creating prior art that permanently blocks competitors from obtaining their own patents on the same technology. Alternatively, a simple defensive publication in a searchable database such as IP.com<\/a> can be submitted at minimal cost. This deprives competitors of a weapon without requiring the inventor to pay prosecution and maintenance fees for an enforced right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Wikipedia <\/a>\u00b7 DPMA patent strategy guidance<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 19 \u2014 High Practical Relevance for Manufacturers: Patents Are Unenforceable Against Chinese Manufacturers<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Even a validly granted patent in the US or EU provides no meaningful protection against Chinese manufacturers. Chinese courts do not enforce foreign patents on behalf of foreign inventors. Customs seizures intercept only a fraction of infringing goods. J\u00f6rg Sprave describes watching identical copies of his products appear on AliExpress shortly after launch, with no practical recourse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources:\u00a0J\u00f6rg Sprave, Slingshot Channel<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 WIPO \/ USTR IP enforcement reports<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. China’s IP enforcement has improved dramatically and Chinese companies now have a direct interest in reciprocal enforcement.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

China overhauled its Patent Law in 2020 (fourth amendment), established specialised IP courts in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu, raised damage awards substantially, and has been actively enforcing foreign patent rights. Between 2016 and 2020, IP litigation in China tripled. Emerald Publishing (2024)<\/a> documents these reforms. Chinese companies like Huawei and CATL now assert large patent portfolios aggressively in European courts \u2014 giving them a direct economic interest in Chinese courts’ reciprocal enforcement of European patents. “Patents are worthless in China” was a reasonable description of 2005. It is no longer accurate in 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: China Patent Law 4th Amendment (2020)<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0Emerald Publishing China IP reform (2024)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7\u00a0CSIS (2024)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. European and German enforcement protects the SME’s core markets regardless of China.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

A German Hidden Champion selling precision components primarily in Germany, the EU, the US, and Japan does not need Chinese patent enforcement to benefit substantially from a European patent portfolio. Chinese-manufactured copies infringing a valid EP or DE patent cannot be imported into the EU without triggering customs seizure under EU Customs Enforcement Regulation (608\/2013)<\/a>, border measures, and EU market exclusion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources:\u00a0EU Customs Enforcement Regulation (608\/2013)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 EUIPO Anti-Counterfeiting Database<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0EUIPO\/EPO trade surplus data (2026)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Abandoning European patents because China enforcement is imperfect is a category error with serious competitive consequences.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

European patent protection stops Chinese competitors from selling infringing products in Germany, France, or across 18 EU countries under the Unitary Patent. This is precisely why Chinese companies file hundreds of thousands of patent applications at the EPO. Caldwell Law (2025)<\/a> states plainly: “In 2025 and beyond, your IP strategy is your geopolitical strategy.” Unilateral disarmament is not a competitive strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: EPO filing statistics from China<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0Caldwell Law (2025)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 EUIPO Anti-Counterfeiting Database<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 20 \u2014 From Practitioner Experience: Defending Patents Destroys Inventors Financially \u2014 The Goodyear Precedent<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Charles Goodyear \u2014 inventor of vulcanised rubber and the sixth inductee into the US National Inventors Hall of Fame \u2014 died penniless after spending his resources defending his patent. The Goodyear Company later appropriated his name without compensation. J\u00f6rg Sprave cites this as a narrative archetype: the inventor who holds a valid patent on a genuinely important innovation but is financially destroyed by the cost of defending it. Legal protection on paper is worth nothing when enforcement costs exceed an inventor’s resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources:\u00a0J\u00f6rg Sprave, Slingshot Channel<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 Charles Goodyear historical record<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. The Goodyear case is 180 years old and predates every modern procedural protection for inventors.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Charles Goodyear litigated in the 1840s and 1850s \u2014 before the America Invents Act, before IPR proceedings, before litigation funding, before fee-shifting provisions. Citing Goodyear as evidence against the modern patent system is equivalent to citing 1840s surgical mortality rates as evidence against modern medicine. The modern litigation environment in Germany includes e.g. the D\u00fcsseldorf and Munich patent chambers with streamlined proceedings, preliminary injunctions available within weeks, and predictable cost structures.\u00a0IP Fridays Episode 169 (Prof. H\u00fcttermann on the UPC)<\/a>\u00a0provides an excellent current overview.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: \u00a0IP Fridays Ep. 169 (H\u00fcttermann, UPC)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Patent litigation funding now exists specifically to equalise financial asymmetry.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Third-party patent litigation funding \u2014 from firms like Burford Capital<\/a>, Deminor<\/a> (active in Germany), and Bentham IMF<\/a> \u2014 allows small inventors and SMEs to enforce valid patents against large infringers without bearing all costs upfront. The funder covers prosecution costs in exchange for a share of damages or settlement proceeds. This development, less than 20 years old, directly addresses the financial asymmetry Goodyear experienced.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Burford Capital<\/a> \u00b7 Deminor (Germany)<\/a> \u00b7 Bentham IMF<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. IP insurance eliminates the financial destruction risk Goodyear faced.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

IP insurance products \u2014 available in Germany from Allianz, HDI, and specialist IP insurers \u2014 cover legal costs of both patent enforcement and defense. Combined with a well-drafted patent from qualified counsel, IP insurance eliminates the catastrophic downside risk that made Goodyear’s situation possible. The lesson from Goodyear is not “don’t patent” but “build an IP strategy with the full range of modern risk management tools.” That is precisely what experienced patent counsel provide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: German vs. US IP insurance comparison<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 21 \u2014 Institutional\/Niche: EUIPO Expansion Into Patents Is Institutional Overreach<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Some critics argue that the EUIPO’s potential expansion into patent-adjacent services represents institutional overreach that could further entrench bureaucratic IP structures and duplicate functions already performed by the EPO, creating competing standards, higher costs, and added complexity for applicants. Former USPTO Director David Kappos raised aspects of this in IP Fridays Episode 143<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources: IP Fridays Ep. 143 (David Kappos)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. The Unitary Patent is the answer to this concern \u2014 and it is working.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The Unitary Patent (launched June 2023)<\/a> and the Unified Patent Court (UPC) provide a single patent right covering up to 18 EU member states, administered by the EPO with judicial oversight by the UPC \u2014 not the EUIPO. This is the result of decades of multilateral treaty negotiation designed precisely to reduce fragmentation and cost. The EPO has reported over 75,000 Unitary Patents registered since launch, with strong SME uptake. Single filing, single annuity, single revocation procedure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources:\u00a0UPC Agreement<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 \u00a0IP Fridays Ep. 143 (Kappos)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. The EUIPO’s SME Fund reduces barriers rather than creating them.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The EUIPO’s IP SME Fund<\/a> has provided hundreds of millions of euros in grant support for SMEs seeking IP registration, including patent-related services at the EPO. This is not bureaucratic expansion \u2014 it is a deliberate policy to democratise IP access for companies that cannot otherwise afford protection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: EUIPO SME Fund<\/a> \u00b7 EUIPO\/EPO (2026)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Institutional coordination between EUIPO and EPO improves consistency, not duplication.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The five joint EUIPO\/EPO industry-level IP contribution studies \u2014 the most recent covering 2021\u20132023, published January 2026 \u2014 have produced the most comprehensive economic data on IP and innovation that European policymakers possess. Coordination between the two offices on SME support, startup finance data, and enforcement has demonstrably improved the European IP ecosystem’s responsiveness to smaller innovators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources:\u00a0EUIPO\/EPO (2026)<\/a>\u00a0joint study \u00b7 EPO\/EUIPO cooperation framework<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patent Critic Myth 22 \u2014 The Libertarian\/Austrian School Argument: Patents Are Aggression Against Tangible Property Owners \u2014 The Kinsella Argument<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Critics’ Argument<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

N. Stephan Kinsella’s monograph Against Intellectual Property<\/em><\/a> (Journal of Libertarian Studies, 2001; Mises Institute, 2008) presents the most philosophically rigorous libertarian case against patents. His argument is not primarily economic \u2014 it is structural. Kinsella begins from the Austrian\/libertarian premise that property rights arise from scarcity: we need property rules only for rivalrous resources, because conflict over non-scarce goods is impossible. Ideas, unlike land or physical objects, are non-scarce \u2014 my use of an idea does not diminish your ability to use it simultaneously. Therefore, Kinsella argues, IP rights are not genuine property rights at all but state-granted monopoly privileges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

His second and sharpest argument is that patents are not merely a failure to protect something \u2014 they are an act of aggression against innocent third parties. When A holds a patent, A can prevent B from manufacturing a product using only B’s own labor, B’s own materials, and B’s own machines, even if B independently arrived at the same idea. The patent does not just protect A’s physical property; it gives A a legally enforced veto over what B does with B’s physical property. He also rejects the labor-theory-of-IP argument on the grounds that creation is categorically different from homesteading scarce physical resources, which is the only legitimate origin of property under the Lockean framework he applies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critic sources:\u00a0N. Stephan Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property, Mises Institute (2008)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 Murray Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State (1962)<\/a> \u00b7 Tom Palmer, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 13 (1990)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Myth Is Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1. The scarcity argument proves too much \u2014 it would also eliminate contract, corporate, and financial property rights.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Kinsella’s framework holds that property rights can only attach to rivalrous, scarce physical resources. But this standard, applied consistently, would eliminate many property rights that Kinsella himself presumably accepts: the right to future performance under a contract (no physical resource is held), equity shares in a corporation (which represent a claim on an abstract legal entity, not a specific physical object), a bank deposit (which is a claim against the bank’s balance sheet, not specific banknotes), or a licence to use land. All of these involve enforceable rights over non-physical or abstract entitlements backed by state coercion. If “only scarce physical resources can be owned” is the test, then modern commercial law \u2014 which Kinsella does not propose to abolish \u2014 fails it comprehensively. The relevant question is not whether an idea is non-rivalrous in the abstract, but whether a legally defined exclusive right over its commercial exploitation produces net social benefits \u2014 which, as the EUIPO\/EPO data<\/a> and NBER startup studies<\/a> demonstrate, it demonstrably does.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: General property rights theory \u00b7 EUIPO\/EPO (2026)<\/a> \u00b7 Farre-Mensa et al. NBER (2020)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. The “aggression against tangible property owners” argument mischaracterises what a patent actually does.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Kinsella’s most powerful claim is that a patent gives the patent holder a veto over what third parties do with their own physical property \u2014 and that this constitutes aggression. The argument is rhetorically striking but analytically incomplete. All property rights constrain what others can do. My ownership of a piece of land prevents you from walking across it using only your own legs and your own time. My copyright prevents you from using your own printing press on your own paper to reproduce my text. Contract law prevents you from using your own labour in ways that breach your commitments. In each case, a legally recognised right restricts a third party’s use of their own physical resources \u2014 yet Kinsella does not characterise land ownership, copyright, or contract as “aggression.” The principle that “all my actions using only my own property must be unrestricted by others” is not a coherent foundation for any legal order, because it ignores the relational nature of all rights. What makes a restriction legitimate is not the absence of physical contact but the justice of the underlying right \u2014 and patent law’s underlying right is grounded in the constitutional quid pro quo of disclosure for temporary exclusivity, a social bargain with demonstrable public benefits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: US Constitution Art. I, Section 8, Cl. 8<\/a> \u00b7\u00a0National Law Review \/ Sedona Conference (2025)<\/a>\u00a0\u00b7 General jurisprudence of property rights<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. The independent invention argument is answered by the patent’s disclosure bargain \u2014 and by the practical alternative.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Kinsella argues that it is unjust to prevent B from independently inventing the same thing as A and using it freely. This has surface appeal, but consider the practical consequence of a “no patent for any invention someone else might independently reach” rule: inventors would abandon disclosure entirely in favour of perpetual trade secrecy. If A can protect the invention only by keeping it secret, A keeps it secret. B, who independently arrives at the same invention, also keeps it secret. The public receives no technical disclosure, no ability to design around, no certainty about freedom to operate, and no expiry after 20 years. Notably, Kinsella himself acknowledges in his paper (pp. 11\u201312) that a competitor who independently invents the subject of a trade secret can patent it and prevent the original inventor from using the invention \u2014 inadvertently making the pro-patent case that a patent system with defined terms and mandatory disclosure is preferable to perpetual trade secrecy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Kinsella (2008)<\/a>, trade secret discussion pp. 11\u201312 \u00b7 NSCAI Final Report, Ch. 12<\/a> \u00b7 WIPO Economic Development & Patents<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Verdict: What the Evidence Actually Shows<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Twenty-two arguments against patents. Not one of them, examined carefully against the available evidence, makes the case for abolition. Several \u2014 NPE abuse, low-quality patent grants, and the wrong-attorney problem \u2014 identify real pathologies that deserve targeted reform. Some initiatives by patent applicants such as the Industry Patent Quality Charter IPQC<\/a> address these issues as well. Others rest on philosophical premises that prove too much, historical examples too old to be probative, or sector-specific observations generalized into universal claims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Numbers Are Unambiguous<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The\u00a0EUIPO\/EPO joint study (2026)<\/a>\u00a0\u2014 the most comprehensive measurement of IP’s economic role ever conducted in Europe \u2014 found that patent-intensive industries alone account for 18.4% of EU GDP and 11.8% of employment. IPR-intensive industries as a whole generate 47.9% of EU GDP, employ 65 million people at wages 40.9% above the EU average, account for 78.3% of EU exports, and attract 88% of all European venture capital. Germany, with its Hidden Champions and engineering SME, has above-average shares of patent-intensive employment among major EU economies. These industries did not achieve this by accident. They achieved it by treating patents as operational assets, not theoretical constructs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Startups, the Evidence Is Equally Clear<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The\u00a0NBER patent lottery study (Farre-Mensa et al., 2020)<\/a>\u00a0\u2014 which used quasi-random assignment of patent examiners to establish causality, not just correlation \u2014 found that a first patent causes startups to grow 55% faster in employment and 80% faster in sales over five years, increases VC funding probability by 47%, increases access to patent-backed loans by 76%, and more than doubles the probability of an IPO. The effect is largest for first-time founders outside major startup hubs. The\u00a0EUIPO\/EPO startup finance study (2023)<\/a>\u00a0confirms that patent-holding European startups are more than twice as likely to achieve a successful exit. For an SME company raising growth capital or preparing for an M&A process, this is not an abstract point.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Geopolitical Dimension Has Changed Everything<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The patent critics’ arguments were largely developed in an academic context where the relevant comparison was between US and European innovators operating in similar IP environments. That world no longer exists. China overtook the US as the leading PCT filer at WIPO in 2019. Huawei, CATL, BYD, and hundreds of Chinese SME equivalents now assert patent portfolios aggressively in European markets.\u00a0CSIS (2024)<\/a>\u00a0documents that every weakening of US patent rights has created a strategic vacuum that China’s deliberate IP strengthening strategy is designed to exploit. A European SME that dismisses its own patent portfolio as a bureaucratic expense while its Chinese competitors file aggressively at the EPO is not being skeptical \u2014 it is being strategically na\u00efve.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What the Critics Get Right \u2014 and Why Reform Is Not Abolition<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The patent critics’ most important contribution is keeping the system honest: demanding quality examination, resisting legal complexity, exposing NPE abuse, pushing for better enforcement reform. The PTAB was created, in part, because quality concerns were real. The Alice decision addressed legitimate software patent overreach. Germany’s AMNOG system proves that patent-enabled drug development and patient-affordable pricing can coexist, given the right downstream market regulation. None of these reforms require abolition. They require precision. Between “the system has real problems” and “delete all IP law” lies a very long road \u2014 and the evidence does not support the journey.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Practical Conclusion for Companies<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

If you run or advise a company, the patent critics’ arguments \u2014 however intellectually interesting \u2014 do not describe your competitive reality. Your reality is: a competitor can copy your product design in 18 months. A larger company can adopt your production process the day you sell your first product without patent protection. A venture investor or strategic acquirer will discount your company’s value substantially if your technology is unprotected. Your most important asset \u2014 the engineering knowledge embedded in your products and processes \u2014 is exactly the kind of IP that patents exist to protect. The question is not whether patents are perfect. They are not. The question is whether the alternative \u2014 trade secrecy, first-mover advantage, and hope \u2014 is better. It is not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patents are good. Use them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n
Need help with patents? Contact me!<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Here is a fact that rarely gets stated plainly: the cancer drugs that saved lives in your family, the precision tools that German manufacturers sell across the world, and the mRNA technology that ended the COVID pandemic were all built on patent protection. Every credible attempt to abolish patents or gut patent enforcement has been … Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":34083,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"content-type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[63],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-105486","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blog"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nPatents Are Good \u2014 Busting the Myths of Patent Critics - Dr. Rolf Claessen<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Patents Are Good \u2014 Busting the Myths of Patent Critics - Dr. Rolf Claessen\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Here is a fact that rarely gets stated plainly: the cancer drugs that saved lives in your family, the precision tools that German manufacturers sell across the world, and the mRNA technology that ended the COVID pandemic were all built on patent protection. Every credible attempt to abolish patents or gut patent enforcement has been … Read more\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Dr. Rolf Claessen\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/rolfclaessen\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:author\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/rolfclaessen\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-05-09T11:13:32+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-05-09T11:13:34+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/rolf-claessen_koeln_blogpost.webp\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1440\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"810\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/webp\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"rolf.claessen\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@rclaessen\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@rclaessen\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"rolf.claessen\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"58 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"rolf.claessen\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/f46be72920cf6a069b7e954fced7ca73\"},\"headline\":\"Patents Are Good \u2014 Busting the Myths of Patent Critics\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-05-09T11:13:32+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-05-09T11:13:34+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":10086,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/f46be72920cf6a069b7e954fced7ca73\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/02\\\/rolf-claessen_koeln_blogpost.webp\",\"articleSection\":[\"Blog\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\\\/\",\"name\":\"Patents Are Good \u2014 Busting the Myths of Patent Critics - Dr. Rolf Claessen\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/02\\\/rolf-claessen_koeln_blogpost.webp\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-05-09T11:13:32+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-05-09T11:13:34+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/02\\\/rolf-claessen_koeln_blogpost.webp\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/02\\\/rolf-claessen_koeln_blogpost.webp\",\"width\":1440,\"height\":810,\"caption\":\"Rolf Claessen\"},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Startseite\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Patents Are Good \u2014 Busting the Myths of Patent Critics\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/\",\"name\":\"Dr. Rolf Claessen - Patentanwalt in D\u00fcsseldorf - Patente, Marken, Designs\",\"description\":\"Patentanwalt - Patente, Marken, Designs\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/f46be72920cf6a069b7e954fced7ca73\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":[\"Person\",\"Organization\"],\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/en\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/f46be72920cf6a069b7e954fced7ca73\",\"name\":\"rolf.claessen\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/07\\\/Vorschaubild-Linkedin-Open-Graph.webp\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/07\\\/Vorschaubild-Linkedin-Open-Graph.webp\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/07\\\/Vorschaubild-Linkedin-Open-Graph.webp\",\"width\":1200,\"height\":630,\"caption\":\"rolf.claessen\"},\"logo\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/07\\\/Vorschaubild-Linkedin-Open-Graph.webp\"},\"description\":\"Dr. Rolf Claessen ist Patentanwalt in D\u00fcsseldorf und ber\u00e4t Unternehmen zu allen Fragestellungen rund um Patente, Marken und Designs. Er ist Autor, Speaker und ist der \u00d6ffentlichkeit durch seine Mitwirkung an der Sat.1 Show \u201eWie genial ist das denn ?!\u201c, den Youtubekanal und seine Podcasts bekannt.\",\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/rolfclaessen.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/rolfclaessen\",\"https:\\\/\\\/www.instagram.com\\\/rolfclaessen\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/www.linkedin.com\\\/in\\\/claessen\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/rclaessen\",\"https:\\\/\\\/www.youtube.com\\\/rolfclaessen\",\"https:\\\/\\\/de.wikipedia.org\\\/wiki\\\/Rolf_Claessen\"]}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Patents Are Good \u2014 Busting the Myths of Patent Critics - Dr. Rolf Claessen","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Patents Are Good \u2014 Busting the Myths of Patent Critics - Dr. Rolf Claessen","og_description":"Here is a fact that rarely gets stated plainly: the cancer drugs that saved lives in your family, the precision tools that German manufacturers sell across the world, and the mRNA technology that ended the COVID pandemic were all built on patent protection. Every credible attempt to abolish patents or gut patent enforcement has been … Read more","og_url":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/","og_site_name":"Dr. Rolf Claessen","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/rolfclaessen","article_author":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/rolfclaessen","article_published_time":"2026-05-09T11:13:32+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-05-09T11:13:34+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1440,"height":810,"url":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/rolf-claessen_koeln_blogpost.webp","type":"image\/webp"}],"author":"rolf.claessen","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@rclaessen","twitter_site":"@rclaessen","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"rolf.claessen","Est. reading time":"58 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/"},"author":{"name":"rolf.claessen","@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/f46be72920cf6a069b7e954fced7ca73"},"headline":"Patents Are Good \u2014 Busting the Myths of Patent Critics","datePublished":"2026-05-09T11:13:32+00:00","dateModified":"2026-05-09T11:13:34+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/"},"wordCount":10086,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/f46be72920cf6a069b7e954fced7ca73"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/rolf-claessen_koeln_blogpost.webp","articleSection":["Blog"],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/","url":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/","name":"Patents Are Good \u2014 Busting the Myths of Patent Critics - Dr. Rolf Claessen","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/rolf-claessen_koeln_blogpost.webp","datePublished":"2026-05-09T11:13:32+00:00","dateModified":"2026-05-09T11:13:34+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/rolf-claessen_koeln_blogpost.webp","contentUrl":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/rolf-claessen_koeln_blogpost.webp","width":1440,"height":810,"caption":"Rolf Claessen"},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/patents-are-good-busting-the-myths-of-patent-critics\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Startseite","item":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Patents Are Good \u2014 Busting the Myths of Patent Critics"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/#website","url":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/","name":"Dr. Rolf Claessen - Patentanwalt in D\u00fcsseldorf - Patente, Marken, Designs","description":"Patentanwalt - Patente, Marken, Designs","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/f46be72920cf6a069b7e954fced7ca73"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":["Person","Organization"],"@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/f46be72920cf6a069b7e954fced7ca73","name":"rolf.claessen","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/Vorschaubild-Linkedin-Open-Graph.webp","url":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/Vorschaubild-Linkedin-Open-Graph.webp","contentUrl":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/Vorschaubild-Linkedin-Open-Graph.webp","width":1200,"height":630,"caption":"rolf.claessen"},"logo":{"@id":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/Vorschaubild-Linkedin-Open-Graph.webp"},"description":"Dr. Rolf Claessen ist Patentanwalt in D\u00fcsseldorf und ber\u00e4t Unternehmen zu allen Fragestellungen rund um Patente, Marken und Designs. Er ist Autor, Speaker und ist der \u00d6ffentlichkeit durch seine Mitwirkung an der Sat.1 Show \u201eWie genial ist das denn ?!\u201c, den Youtubekanal und seine Podcasts bekannt.","sameAs":["https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com","https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/rolfclaessen","https:\/\/www.instagram.com\/rolfclaessen\/","https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/in\/claessen\/","https:\/\/x.com\/rclaessen","https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/rolfclaessen","https:\/\/de.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Rolf_Claessen"]}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/105486","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=105486"}],"version-history":[{"count":10,"href":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/105486\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":105582,"href":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/105486\/revisions\/105582"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/34083"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=105486"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=105486"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rolfclaessen.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=105486"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}